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MR. JUSTICE MINTON-HOOSIER JUSTICE ON THE
SUPREME COURTt
HARRY L. WALLACEt
V. ILLUSTRATIVE PROBLEMS OF
FEDERAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
As every lawyer knows, it is extremely difficult to draft any docu-
ment, the meaning of which is crystal clear with respect to every situation
to which it may apply at some time in the future. Particularly in
light of the sometimes hectic conditions under which federal legislation
is considered and adopted, it is not surprising that ambiguities arise in
the volumes of federal statutes, interpretation of which consumes a sub-
stantial portion of the Court's time.
A. CONSTRUCTION OF FEDERAL STATUTES
LIMITING INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
1. Construction of Criminal Statutes. Illustrative of Justice MVin-
ton's approach to problems of statutory construction is his opinion sus-
taining a conviction for interstate transportation of obscene phonograph
records'2 under a statute prohibiting such shipment of "any obscene . ..
book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film, paper, letter, writing, print,
or other matter of indecent character. ' 2  Justice Minton rejected the
defendant's contention, adopted by the court below, that "other matter"
should be limited to "objects comprehensible by sight only '3 29 since all the
objects specifically listed were so limited. "We are aware that this is a
criminal statute and must be strictly construed. This means that no of-
fense may be created except by the words of Congress used in their usual
and ordinary sense."33  But "statutes are construed in their entire con-
text. This is a comprehensive statute, which should not be constricted by
a mechanical rule of construction. We find nothing in the statute or its
history to indicate that Congress intended to limit the applicable portion
of the statute to such indecent matter as is comprehended through the
sense of sight."33' The dissent urged that the statute was not "suffici-
t This is the second of two parts. The first part appeared at 34 IND. L.J. 145 (1959).
t Associate in the firm of Fairchild, Foley & Sammond, Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
formerly law clerk to Justice Minton.
327. United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680 (1950).
328. 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1952).
329. United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 682 (1950).
330. Id. at 681.
331. Id. at 684.
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ently clear to apprise people" '332 that it encompassed phonograph records.
More interesting, however, is the dissent's protest against censorship and
its conclusion that the Court's decision i'cannot be based" on the "tre-
mendous difference between cultural treasures and the [admittedly ob-
scene] phonograph records here involved." '  Following Justice Min-
ton's retirement, a majority of the Court sustained the constitutionality
of such legislation on the ground that however preferred the position of
free speech, the Constitution does not render government impotent to
suppress pornography.33
In another case335 the Court held that interstate transportation of
two women at the same time for immoral purposes constituted only one
violation of the Mann Act's prohibition of such transportation "of any
woman or girl." '36 The basis for the Court's decision was that "the am-
biguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. . . . It may fairly be said
to be a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of
a penal code against the imposition of a harsher punishment." ' 7 Justice
Minton dissented on the ground that "the statute does not seem ambig-
uous to me."3 8  To him "any" meant "any" since "Congress had as its
purpose the protection of the individual woman or girl from exploitation,
and the transportation of each female was to be punished." '339
Similarly, Justice Minton wrote the Court's opinion340 holding that
false statements to Treasury agents made to conceal an earlier false tax
return violated a provision of the Internal Revenue Code which "in addi-
tion to other penalties provided by law" proscribed attempts to evade
taxes "in any manner."341 He reached that result even though false state-
ments to administrative agencies are also punishable under another stat-
ute, 4 2 saying, "At least where different proof is required for each of-
fense, a single act or transaction may violate more than one criminal
statute." '4 3  Even this careful qualification concerning different proof
proved unnecessary when, following Justice Minton's retirement, the
332. Id. at 685 (dissenting opinion).
333. Id. at 687 (dissenting opinion).
334. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) ; see also Kingsley Books, Inc. v.
Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957) ; cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) ; Joseph Bur-
styn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
335. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955).
336. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1952).
337. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
338. Id. at 84 (dissenting opinion).
339. Ibid.
340. United States v. Beacon Brass Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 43 (1952).
341. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 145 (b) ; see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7201.
342. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1952).
343. United States v. Beacon Brass Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 43, 45 (1952).
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Court held that even where the proof required under two different crimi-
nal statutes is the same, the trial court need not instruct the jury with re-
spect to the crime bearing the lesser punishment.344 This latter decision
may help cast in its proper light the scholarship supporting Justice
Douglas' statement in Rosenberg v. United States that "it is law too
elemental for citation of authority that where two penal statutes may
apply-one carrying death, the other imprisonment-the court has no
choice but to impose the less harsh sentence."34
However, "any" was not always all-inclusive for Justice Minton.
For example, where a statute punishing theft of "mail or any article or
thing" was amended to apply to "any article or thing,"34 Justice Minton
joined a dissent which urged that the statute as amended did not apply to
mail.347 He joined in another decision that a course of conduct is the
unit of crime for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act,348 so that
payment of below-standard wages does not constitute a separate crime for
each employee underpaid each week." 9 In another case he joined in dis-
senting from a decision sustaining a conviction for the sale of a non-
existent public office"' on the ground that "any appointive office or place
under the United States"3'' applies only to actual and existing offices.
Justice Minton himself wrote the Court's opinion upsetting a con-
viction for mailing matters "concerning any lottery"3 2 on the ground that
the statute, being penal, "must be strictly construed," '53 and as so inter-
preted, did not apply to matters merely suggesting a lottery. Along
somewhat the same line was his dissent from the sustaining of a convic-
tion for using the mails to defraud as applied to a co-defendant who was
unaware of the use of the mails. 5 4 To Justice Minton "this is simply
guessing Braden into the federal penitentiary. It may be good guessing,
but it is not proof."3 5
Another example of Justice Minton's approach to these interpretive
problems is found in a series of decisions concerning the application of
the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act which provided that in
344. Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131 (1956).
345. 346 U.S. 273, 312 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
346. 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1952).
347. Tinder v. United States, 345 U.S. 565 (1953).
348. 52 Stat. 1068-69 (1938), as amended, 63 Stat. 919, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215, 216(a)
(1952).
349. United States v. Universal CIT Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952).
350. United States v. Hood, 343 U.S. 148 (1952).
351. 18 U.S.C. § 215 (1952).
352. 35 Stat. 1129-30 (1909) ; see 18 U.S.C. § 1302 (Supp. V, 1958).
353. United States v. Halseth, 342 U.S. 277, 280 (1952).
354. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
355. Id. at 15 (dissenting opinion).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
actions involving fraud, "the running of any existing statute of limita-
tions . . . shall be suspended until three years after the termination of
hostilities." '56  Justice Minton joined in one decision holding that this
statute applied to crimes involving fraud, whether or not denominated as
such. 57 In a companion case he joined in dissenting from the Court's
decision that it applied only to "pecuniary" frauds.358  He himself wrote
the dissent in a 5-4 decision in which the Court held that the Suspension
Act did not apply at all to offenses committed after the declaration of
the end of the war.355 In both of these dissents Justice Minton opposed
an interpretation of the Suspension Act which limited its application by
adding a qualification not found in the express language of the statute
itself.
His votes in all these cases demonstrate no particular inclination in
favor of or against the defendants' claims, while his opinions indicate
several other factors which did influence his decisions. First, in the ab-
sence of an ambiguity in the language of the statute, he was reluctant to
depart from a literal interpretation of that language. Second, while he
conceded that criminal statutes should be strictly construed in favor of
the defendant, he would not depart from the literal language where he
saw no ambiguity. Finally, more than many of the Justices, he relied on
analogous decisions of the Court, even though they were from another
era or of another "vintage." 6 '
2. Construction of Statutes Relating to Aliens. The scope of the
substantive power which the federal government has and exercises over
aliens is illustrated by decisions in which Justice Minton joined holding
that an alien may be deported for Communist Party membership which
terminated prior to enactment of the statute expressly making such mem-
bership grounds for deportation.36' Moreover, the property of enemy
aliens can be seized, in Justice Minton's words, even in the absence of
"proof of actual use of the property for economic warfare against the
United States. The crucial fact is not the actual use by an enemy-
tainted corporation of its power in economic warfare against the United
States. It is the existence of that power that is controlling and against
which the Government of the United States may move. The Govern-
356. 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (1952).
357. United States v. Grainger, 346 U.S. 235 (1953).
358. Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953).
359. United States v. Smith, 342 U.S. 225 (1952).
360. See Mitchell v. C.W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427, 434 (1954) (dissenting
opinion).
361. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) ; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580 (1950).
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ment does not have to wait for the enemy to do its worst before it acts." '362
Even procedural protections were denied to entering aliens in view
of Justice Minton's conclusion in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaugh-
nessy that "whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."36 In that case the
question was whether or not an alien war bride could be excluded with-
out a hearing where the general security statutes authorized such action
but the War Brides Act provided for admission of war brides "other-
wise admissible under the immigration laws" without regard to quotas or
physical and mental requirements. 4 Having determined that there was
no constitutional objection to exclusion without a hearing, Justice Minton
concluded that even an alien war bride is subject to the security statutes
since she must be "otherwise admissible" to secure entry under the War
Brides Act.
The dissenters in the Knauff case did not challenge the power of
Congress to exclude an entering alien without a hearing, but rather urged
that, as in criminal cases, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
alien, particularly in view of the general policy embodied in the War
Brides Act of relaxing restrictions with respect to alien spouses of vet-
erans. Justices Frankfurter, Black and Jackson, the dissenters in the
Knauff case, relied on the same ground of resolving doubts in favor of
the alien in dissenting from another decision in which Justice Minton
joined"' holding that a denaturalized citizen convicted of espionage while
a citizen could be deported under a statute providing for deportation of
aliens convicted of espionage. 6 Similarly, Justice Frankfurter (who
wrote the Court's opinion, in which Justice Minton joined, sustaining the
deportation of an alien for past Communist Party membership) 67 wrote
the opinion in a case following Justice Minton's retirement reversing a
deportation order on the ground that there was no showing that the alien's
Party membership was "meaningful," a requirement not expressly set
forth in the statute.36
Justice Minton himself wrote the Court's opinion holding that a
Swiss alien did not waive his right to become a citizen by claiming ex-
emption from the draft, even though a statute so provided, where both
the State Department and the Swiss Legation had advised him errone-
362. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, A.G. v. McGrath, 343 U.S. 205, 212 (1952).
363. 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
364. 59 Stat. 659 (1945).
365. United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 (1950).
366. 41 Stat. 573 (1920) ; see 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (17) (1952).
367. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); cf. Lehman v. United States ex rel.
Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (1957) ; Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
368. Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957).
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ously that, by virtue of a treaty between the United States and Switzer-
land, he would not lose the right to apply for citizenship." 9 "Petitioner
did not knowingly and intentionally waive his rights to citizenship ...
Considering all the circumstances of the case, we think that to bar peti-
tioner, nothing less than an intelligent waiver is required by elementary
fairness. . . . To hold otherwise would be to entrap petitioner. 370
That Justice Minton was not so sympathetic with less desirable
aliens is revealed by his dissent from the Court's decision that coming into
the United States from the Philippines while the latter was a United
States' possession was not an "entry" into the United States, 7 ' so that
an alien so doing was not deportable for his subsequent crimes under a
statute authorizing deportation for crimes "committed at any time after
entry. 3 72  The majority reasoned that "although not penal in character,
deportation statutes as a practical matter may inflict 'the equivalent of
banishment or exile,' . . . and should be strictly construed. 3 73  Justice
Minton protested forthrightly against the policy underlying this ap-
proach to this question of statutory interpretation, saying:
The effect of the Court's opinion is to construe the Act
strictly in favor of the convicted criminal sought to be deported
for his criminal acts, rather than in favor of the United States
in protection of its citizens. I know of no good reason why we
should by strained construction of an Act compel the United
States to cling onto alien criminals. It is not the public policy
of this country to construe its statutes strictly in favor of alien
criminals whose convictions have already been established of
record. Why should we give a strained construction to the
word 'entry' in the instant case? The least we should do is to
give the word "entry" its ordinary meaning."'
His votes in these cases relating to aliens follow a pattern similar to
his votes in criminal cases. He adhered to a literal interpretation of such
statutes and refused to depart from it to avoid seemingly harsh results.
Moreover, the last case quoted above illustrates that he considered the
protection of citizens from criminals just as important as the claimed
rights of admitted criminals, a view consistent with his general approach
369. Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951).
370. Id. at 47.
371. Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637 (1954); cf. Rabang v. Boyd, 353 U.S. 427
(1957).
372. 39 Stat. 889 (1917), as amended, 54 Stat. 671 (1940), 56 Stat. 1044 (1942),
62 Stat. 1206 (1948).
373. Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 642-43 (1954).
374. Id. at 643 (dissenting opinion).
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to many of the procedural problems in the administration of criminal
justiceY"
B. INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL STATUTES REGULATING COMMERCE
1. Federal Compensation Acts. Congress has enacted a number of
statutes designed to afford compensation to injured employees. The
right to and amount of recovery differs in each. Sometimes Congress
expressly provided that a particular remedy should be exclusive where it
applies, and in other instances the coverage of two acts appears to over-
lap, while many other employees are not covered by any federal act.
Borderline cases in situations such as these presented the Court with a
number of difficult interpretive problems. For example, Justice Minton
joined in one decision 7 holding that a man doing off-season on-shore
repair work is not a "seaman" covered by the Jones Act 377 (and reserving
decision as to the applicability of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act) .17 He joined in dissenting from another
decision holding that the Federal Employees' Compensation Act..9 is the
exclusive remedy for government employees, even though it did not ex-
pressly so provide and the literal language of the Public Vessels Act38
also covered the particular claimant.38' Justice Minton's votes in these
two cases are consistent with his usual literal interpretation of statutory
language whether, as in the latter case, it would benefit the claimant, or,
as in the former case, it resulted in denial of his claim.
He purported to follow the same formula in writing the dissent
from a 5-4 decision382 holding that a railroad brakeman injured on navig-
able waters is covered by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's
Compensation Act and, because that Act is by its terms exclusive, not by
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 3  Although the Compensation
Act applies to injuries upon navigable waters if the employer has "any
. . . employees . . . employed in maritime employment," '384 and it was
clear that the defendant railroad did have some employees so engaged,
Justice Minton assumed that "there is but one question here and that is
whether this respondent was engaged in 'maritime employment' at the
375. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
376. Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187 (1952).
377. 38 Stat. 1185 (1915), as amended, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. 8 688
(1952).
378. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1952).
379. 39 Stat. 742 (1916), 5 U.S.C. §§ 751-801 (1952).
380. 43 Stat. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-99 (1952).
381. Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427 (1952).
382. Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334 (1953).
383. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §8 51-60 (1952).
384. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. 8 902(4) (1952).
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time of his injury."8 5 His answer to this question, that a railroad brake-
man on a car float is engaged in railroad employment and not maritime
employment, seems correct, but this was not the question presented by
the case and answered by a majority of the Court.
In another case Justice Minton wrote the opinion of the Court hold-
ing that where the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act required claims to be "filed within one year after the injury,"'
claims were barred if not filed within a year after the injury even though
compensable disability from the injury did not arise until later."' The
reasoning of his opinion once again reveals the considerations which in-
fluenced him in deciding these interpretive problems:
We are not free, under the guise of construction, to amend
the statute by inserting therein before the word "injury" the
word "compensable" so as to make "injury" read as if it were
"disability." Congress knew the difference between "disability"
and "injury" and used the words advisedly. . . . Congress
meant what it said when it limited recovery to one year from
date of injury, and "injury" does not mean "disability."
We are aware that this is a humanitarian act, and that it
should be construed liberally to effectuate its purposes; but that
does not give us the power to rewrite the statute of limitations
at will, and make what was intended to be a limitation no limi-
tation at all. Petitioners' construction would have the effect of
extending the limitation indefinitely if a claim for disability
had not been filed; the provision would then be one of exten-
sion rather than limitation. While it might be desirable for the
statute to provide as petitioners contend, the power to change
the statute is with Congress, not us."'8
2. Construction of Statutes Regulating Labor Relations. The Na-
tional Labor Relations Act"' was adopted in 1935 to promote "industrial
peace" through collective bargaining by protecting employees' rights to
organize and bargain collectively from employer interference. The once
controversial Taft-Hartley Act... added prohibitions against certain union
practices. The legislative battle continues, but the concern of the Court
is and was to interpret as best it can the existing legislation.
385. Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 342 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
386. 44 Stat. 1432 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 913(a) (1952).
387. Pillsbury v. United Engineering Co., 342 U.S. 197 (1952).
388. Id. at 199-200; cf. Fogarty v. United States, 340 U.S. 8 (1950).
389. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1952).
390. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1952).
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Much of the litigation has turned on whether the discharge of a par-
ticular employee was for the purpose of discouraging union organization
or for justifiable cause. The original Act, however, provided that it
should not preclude an employer from entering into a closed shop con-
tract with the union representing its employees. 9' Justice Minton wrote
the opinion for the Court holding that by virtue of this provision, under
a closed shop contract an employer could discharge employees who had
been expelled from the union even though this admittedly interfered with
the organization and bargaining rights of the employees discharged.9 2
Congress could reasonably adopt this compromise since the closed shop
"protects the integrity of the union and provides stability in labor rela-
tions"39 3 which "was the primary objective of Congress." 9 ' "It is not
necessary for us to justify the policy of Congress. It is enough that we
find it in the statute." 9' Consistently, following legislative reversal of
this decision by the Taft-Hartley Act, he joined in a decision holding it
an unfair labor practice to discharge a non-union employee if the probable
consequence is to encourage union membership. 8'
Having determined that an employee was wrongfully discharged,
the National Labor Relations Board has considerable discretion under
the statute in fashioning an appropriate remedy, including awarding re-
instatement and back pay. Thus, Justice Minton wrote the Court's
opinion holding that the Board need not deduct state unemployment com-
pensation benefits from a back pay award.9 ' However, he subsequently
dissented from the Court's opinion sustaining a change in the Board's
method of computing back pay to a quarterly basis. 99 Justice Minton
urged that this method of computation made the employee more than
whole, contrary to the reasoning of the Court's earlier decisions that the
powers conferred on the Board are remedial and not punitive. He also
relied on the fact that Congress had re-enacted the applicable statutory
provision with full knowledge of the Board's earlier rule. He concluded
that:
This Court having laid down this rule, the Board having
consistently applied it for over twelve years, and Congress hav-
ing considered and completely overhauled the Act in 1947 with-
391. 49 Stat. 452 (1935).
392. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355 (1949).
393. Id. at 362.
394. Ibid.
395. Id. at 363; cf. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
396. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
397. NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951).
398. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
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out changing this provision of the statute with its long inter-
pretation, we think it has become part of the administrative
practice that Congress should change if it is to be changed. 99
An employer's obligations are not completed by refraining from in-
terference with union organization. lie must also bargain in good faith
with the collective bargaining representative selected by the employees."9
Determination of compliance with this requirement often involves resolu-
tion of factual disputes. For example, in a 6-3 decision the Court, re-
jecting a ruling of the Board, held that an employer does not commit an
unfair labor practice by bargaining for a "management functions"
clause.4 ' Justice Minton wrote the dissent, not on the ground advanced
by the Labor Board that bargaining for such a clause was a per se viola-
tion, but rather on the ground that in this case the employer had refused
to bargain by adamantly insisting on such a clause. He urged that "an
employer may not stake out an area which is a proper subject of bargain-
ing and say, 'As to this we will not bargain.' . . . If employees' bargain-
ing rights can be cut away so easily, they are indeed illusory."4 2
Justice Minton's opinions in these labor cases illustrate that he was
more concerned with interpreting literally the policy made by Congress
than with formulating desirable labor policy through judicial construc-
tion. They also suggest that he afforded little weight to an administra-
tive interpretation of a specific statute, a view which reappears in a num-
ber of other decisions.
3. Construction of Federal Statutes Regulating Business Competi-
tion. If one confined his reading to the United States Reports, he might
suspect that the business community, which is loudest and most lavish in
its praise of a free enterprise competitive economy, actually devotes a
good bit of its attention to simplifying life by eliminating or minimizing
competition. On the whole Justice Minton's votes were in favor of
vigorous enforcement of competition through the Sherman Act.403 Here
again, however, literal interpretation of the statute sometimes over-
shadowed the policy embodied in it. For example, Justice Minton joined
opinions of the Court holding that such anti-competitive agreements as
price-fixing and division of markets are illegal, even when made between
399. Id. at 356 (dissenting opinion).
400. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1952).
401. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
402. Id. at 413 (dissenting opinion).
403. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952), as amended, 69
Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C.'§ 1 (Supp. V, 1958).
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commonly controlled corporations. 4 or a parent and subsidiary." 5 In
two other cases he joined in decisions limiting the applicability of the pro-
viso to the Sherman Act which under certain circumstances exempts re-
sale price maintenance from the prohibition on price fixing."0 ' In one
such case the Court held that the proviso did not permit enforcement of
state resale price maintenance authorization against non-signers,1 7 a re-
sult soon overruled by Congressional amendment.4"' In the other the
Court held it inapplicable to sales by a manufacturer to a wholesaler
where the seller was also a wholesaler.409
On the other hand he also joined in holding that DuPont's dominant
position with respect to cellophane did not make it guilty of monopoliza-
tion because the relevant market included all flexible packaging materials
and not just cellophane. 1 But he dissented in a somewhat similar deci-
sion in which the Court held that a newspaper's tying of morning and
evening advertising was not illegal because the relevant market included
both morning and evening newspaper advertising. 1' The four dis-
senters urged that the newspaper was illegally using its morning news-
paper monopoly to extend its evening newspaper advertising.
Justice Minton himself wrote the Court's opinion upholding the le-
gality of a patent license whereunder patent royalties were measured by
the licensee's sales of unpatented articles.413 He distinguished the "tie-
in" cases on the ground that "that which is condemned as against public
policy by the 'Tie-in' cases is the extension of the monopoly of the patent
to create another monopoly or restraint of competition-a restraint not
countenanced by the patent grant." 1" The minority contended that by
measuring payment for the patent license by sales of unpatented articles
"the patent owner has therefore used the patents to bludgeon his way in-
to a partnership with this licensee." '414 But Justice Minton concluded that
the agreement was not unlawful because "this royalty provision does not
create another monopoly; it creates no restraint of competition beyond
the legitimate grant of the patent."4"'
404. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
405. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
406. 50 Stat. 693 (1937).
407. Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
408. 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V, 1958).
409. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
410. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
411. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
412. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
413. Id. at 832.
414. Id. at 838 (dissenting opinion).
415. Id. at 833.
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In interpreting a statute as unspecific as the Sherman Act, literal in-
terpretation can take one only so far. It may support the conclusion that
contracts between commonly-controlled corporations or a parent and sub-
sidiary are subject to the Act to the same extent as agreements between
unrelated parties, but it does not help in determining what agreements
are in "restraint of trade or commerce." Thus, as is illustrated by the
patent license case, in such a situation the attention of the Court is neces-
sarily focused on its earlier decisions rather than on the language of the
statute.
C. INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL TAX STATUTES
1. Taxable Income and Deductions. Under a tax structure with a
top rate of ninety-one per cent,41 there is great pressure on the bar, ac-
countants and a wide variety of other professional and amateur tax con-
sultants to devise schemes for converting ordinary income into capital
gain or, better yet, to postpone recognition of the gain altogether. On
the whole, taxpayers fared very poorly at the hands of the Court, in most
instances without as much division of opinion as prevailed in other types
of cases.
justice Minton joined opinions holding a wide variety of receipts
taxable including extorted funds,41 a symphony prize,41 a "proprietary"
stock option,41" insider profits required to be paid over to the taxpayer
corporation,42 anti-trust triple damages,"' and income received under a
mistaken claim of right. 22 He himself wrote the Court's opinion42 hold-
ing that a Coast Guard officer enrolled as a civil service employee was
not entitled to the exemption for compensation received "for active serv-
ice as a commissioned officer.""24  Conceding that the taxpayer occupied
a dual military-civilian status, he concluded "that taxpayer received his
compensation in a civilian status."4 5  "Taxpayer's rank was for the pur-
pose of getting the job done, and not for the purpose of receiving
compensation."42
416. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1.
417. Rutldn v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
418. Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952).
419. Commissioner v. Lo Bue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
420. General Am. Investors Co. v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 434 (1955).
421. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
422. Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953) ; United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S.
590 (1951) ; cf. Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
423. Commissioner v. Connelly, 338 U.S. 258 (1949).
424. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 22(b) (13(A), as amended, 59 Stat. 571 (1945);
see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 112.
425. Commissioner v. Connelly, 338 U.S. 258, 261 (1949).
'426. Id. at 262.
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Taxpayers won a few skirmishes, however. For example, Justice
Minton joined in one decision in which the Court held that income from
the sale of timber from land held in trust for Indians is not taxable, a
victory of somewhat limited application for most of us.42 Of more
general significance was the Court's unanimous decision that a corpora-
tion is not taxable on the gain from the sale of assets by its shareholders
following liquidation of the corporation. 2 Justice Minton wrote the
Court's opinion in another decision for the taxpayer holding that a cor-
poration realizes no gain on the sale of its own treasury stock,429 a result
codified in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954."
Taxpayers had no better success in their attempts to secure capital
gains treatment. For example, Justice Minton joined in holding that
dealings in grain futures gave rise to ordinary income.2 ' But he wrote
the dissent from a decision holding that the portion of the sales price of
an orange grove attributable to unripe oranges was taxable as ordinary
income. 32 The majority concluded that "the proceeds fairly attributable
to the crop are derived from property held by the taxpayer primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness" 433 and therefore within an exception from the capital gains treat-
ment otherwise extended to sales of property used in the taxpayer's trade
or business."4 It pointed to a recent amendment providing for capital
gains treatment for the growing crop as evidence that the prior law, under
which this case was decided, had been different. Justice Minton con-
cluded on the other hand that "the immature crop of green oranges was
not property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of trade or business,"' because "she was in the business of raising and
selling matured fruit. She was not in the business of selling . . . green
fruit growing upon the tree."42 6 Justice Minton put a different interpre-
tation on the subsequent Congressional amendment. He believed that
"Congress was correcting a misinterpretation of the Revenue Act by the
Commissioner and the Tax Court. It was making clear what the Com-
missioner and the Tax Court had obfuscated. I see no reason why we
should strain to uphold a tax which Congress has by recent legislation
427. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
428. United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
429. United States v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 350 U.S. 55 (1955).
430. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1032.
431. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
432. Watson v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 544 (1953).
433. Id. at 551.
434. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 117(j), as amended, 65 Stat. 500 (1951) ; see INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1231(b) (4).
435. Watson v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 544, 557 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
436. Id. at 556 (dissenting opinion).
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determined to be incorrect."43 In light of the generally favorable Con-
gressional treatment afforded to farmers, as evidenced by the subsequent
amendment to the statute in question, Justice Minton's conclusion may
represent a better understanding of Congressional intent than of good
tax law.
2. Priority of Federal Tax Liens. One who gets behind with his
federal taxes is likely to have other creditors as well. The Internal Reve-
nue Code provides that any unpaid federal tax shall be a lien, (ordinarily
arising on the date of assessment) upon all of the property of the tax-
payer, but that the tax lien "shall not be valid as against any mortgagee,
pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been
filed"48 in the appropriate office under state law.
Justice Minton wrote the Court's opinion holding that the existence
of a state tax lien, which under state law was in the nature of a judgment,
did not make the state a judgment creditor within the meaning of the
federal statute. 39 The dissenters urged that a state does not have to fol-
low a particular procedure in creating a judgment within the meaning
of the federal statute, so long as under state law the state tax lien has "the
normal attributes of a judgment."44 But while Justice Minton conceded
that a "state is free to give its own interpretation for the purpose of its
own internal administration,"44' he concluded that the state tax lien was
not a judgment within the meaning of the federal statute because, in his
words:
A cardinal principle of Congress in its tax scheme is uni-
formity, as far as may be. Therefore, a "judgment creditor"
should have the same application in all the states. In this in-
stance, we think Congress used the words "judgment creditor"
in § 3672 in the usual, conventional sense of a judgment of a
court of record, since all states have such courts. We do not
think Congress had in mind the action of taxing authorities who
may be acting judicially as in New Hampshire and some other
states, where the end result is something "in the nature of a
judgment," while in other states the taxing authorities act
quasi-judicially and are considered administrative bodies. 42
437. Id. at 558 (dissenting opinion).
438. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 3672.
439. United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
440. Id. at 367 (dissenting opinion).
441. Id. at 363.
442. Id. at 364.
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Justice Minton later wrote the Court's opinion reaching the same result
with respect to a South Carolina landlord's lien.44
The question most often presented to the Court was the relative
priority of federal tax liens and competing liens which under state law
arose prior to the federal lien. Justice Minton wrote a series of opinions
in such cases, one of which related to the priority of liens for municipal
real property taxes and water rents.444  He held that in the absence of
the insolvency of the debtor (when the priority of claims of the United
States is governed by another statute), the federal tax lien did not take
precedence over other liens which were specific and perfected before the
federal lien arose. Noting that "where the debtor is not insolvent, Con-
gress has failed to expressly provide for federal priority,"4" he concluded
"that priority of these statutory liens is determined by another principle
of law, namely, 'the first in time is the first in right.' ,"'
But the requirement that to be entitled to priority, the competing lien
must have been specific and perfected before the federal tax lien arose,
proved to be a strict one. Justice Minton wrote the Court's opinion hold-
ing that the federal lien took precedence over a California attachment
lien which under state law was "contingent or inchoate-merely a lis
pendens notice that a right to perfect a lien exists."44  Justice Minton
reasoned that:
The effect of a lien in relation to a provision of federal
law for the collection of debts owing the United States is always
a federal question. Hence, although a state court's classifica-
tion of a lien as specific and perfected is entitled to weight, it is
subject to reexamination by this Court. On the other hand, if
the state court itself describes the lien as inchoate, this classifi-
cation is "practically conclusive." . . . Nor can the doctrine of
relation back-which by the process of judicial reasoning
merges the attachment lien in the judgment and relates the
judgment lien back to the date of attachment--operate to de-
stroy the realities of the situation. When the tax liens of the
United States were recorded, Morrison did not have a judgment
lien. He had a mere "caveat of a more perfect lien to come."44
He amplified this reasoning in a subsequent case:
443. United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955); see also United States v.
Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15 (1957).
444. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
445. Id. at 85.
446. Ibid.
447. United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50 (1950).
448. Id. at 49-50.
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Such inchoate liens may become certain as to amount, identity
of the lienor, or the property subject thereto only at some time
subsequent to the date the federal liens attach and cannot then
be permitted to displace such federal liens. Otherwise, a State
could affect the standing of federal liens, contrary to the estab-
lished doctrine, simply by causing an inchoate lien to attach at
some arbitrary time even before the amount of the tax, assess-
ment, etc., is determined. Accordingly, we concluded in Se-
curity Trust "that the tax liens of the United States are superior
to the inchoate attachment lien . . . ." In the instant case,
certain of the City's tax and water-rent liens apparently at-
tached to the specific property and became choate prior to the
attachment of the federal tax liens.449
In two subsequent cases Justice Minton wrote the Court's opinion
according priority to the federal tax lien over a Texas garnishment lien 30
and an Ohio attachment lien (which under state law was perfected at the
time of attachment), 4 51 each of which, the Court concluded, was "for
federal tax purposes an inchoate lien because, at the time the attachment
issued, the fact and the amount of the lien were contingent upon the out-
come of the suit for damages." '452 In several subsequent per curiam de-
cisions,45 the Court reached the same result with respect to mechanics'
liens. The Court's denial of priority to the lien on the facts of one of
these cases embodied such a strict test for perfection of the lien that two
Justices protested that it violated the principle that the "first in time is the
first in right."454
This area is unique in that Justice Minton wrote all of the Court's
opinions during his tenure. Accepting the basic rule that a federal tax
lien takes precedence over prior inchoate liens, his applications of it ap-
pear correct. The Court's per curiam disposition of subsequent cases
seemingly more favorable to the competing lienor has led to the com-
plaint that it is difficult for lawyers, litigants and lower courts to de-
termine the circumstances, if any, under which a prior lien becomes suf-
ficiently perfected to take precedence over a subsequent federal tax
449. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 86-87 (1954).
450. United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955).
451. United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955).
452. Id. at 214.
453. United States v. Hulley, 79 Sup. Ct. 117 (1958) ; United States v. R. F. Ball
Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958); United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S.
1010 (1956) ; United States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808 (1955).
454. United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., supra note 453, at 1011.
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lien?. ' This criticism may be unjustified, since the language of Justice
Minton's opinions quoted above states rather clearly that a competing
lien is perfected when its amount, the identity of the lienor and the
property to which it relates are established with certainty, and when its
continued existence ceases to be contingent on the outcome of subsequent
litigation with the debtor.
VI. CIVIL PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
Just as in criminal cases, procedural questions often have an im-
portant impact on the ultimate outcome of civil litigation. No matter
how meritorious his claim, a litigant cannot get far if the court lacks jur-
isdiction of his opponent or of the action. Similarly a verdict in his
favor may be an expensive victory if it is set aside by the trial court or
reversed on appeal. And no matter how favorably the Supreme Court
might view the merits of a defeated litigant's appeal, all is lost if the
Court cannot or will not hear his case. Sometimes decisions on pro-
cedural grounds may appear to overemphasize "technicalities" at the ex-
pense of justice. But the issues in such cases often involve important
questions of power, not only of state and lower federal courts, but of the
Supreme Court itself.
A. MIGRATORY DIVORCES
A continuing source of litigation concerns the validity of migratory
divorces and related questions of alimony and custody. In the typical
pattern a wife leaves the matrimonial domicile for Reno, Miami or Sun
Valley where, after a short "residence" period, she obtains a divorce.
When some aspect of the decree becomes an issue in subsequent litiga-
tion in a second state, the question arises whether or not the second state
is required to give full faith and credit"' to the decree in the first state.
This in turn often depends upon whether or not the first state had
"jurisdiction."
Unlike actions for money judgments, a state's interest in the matri-
monial status of its domiciliaries is sufficient to give it jurisdiction to
grant a divorce affecting that status without personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. But where the plaintiff's claim to domicile rests solely
on a short period of temporary residence, the basis of the state's jurisdic-
tion is questionable.
In earlier cases the Court had held that the second state need not
give full faith and credit to the first state's ex parte divorce decree if it
455. See Brown, Forward: Process of Law, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72
HARV. L. RPEv. 77, 82-87 (1958).
456. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
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found that the first state lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiff was not
domiciled there, 57 but that it must give full faith and credit to the decree
if the defendant appeared." 8 Accordingly, Justice Minton joined in a
decision remanding a Vermont decision refusing to give full faith and
credit to a Florida divorce for a finding with respect to whether or not
the defendant had appeared in the Florida proceedings."' He also joined
in a decision holding that Illinois must give full faith and credit to a New
York judgment refusing to recognize a Nevada ex parte divorce.4 1' He
did not participate in another decision holding that New York could not
permit a collateral attack by a third person on a Florida divorce where
both parties had appeared in the Florida proceedings and such an attack
was not permitted under Florida law.
4 1
Under these decisions one spouse can secure ex parte a divorce ter-
minating the marriage relationship which is subject to attack in subse-
quent litigation in other states only on the ground that the court granting
it lacked jurisdiction because neither spouse was domiciled there, and even
this attack is foreclosed if the other party appears. But even though
domicile of one of the parties is sufficient to give a state court jurisdic-
tion to terminate the marital status of the parties, it is not necessarily
sufficient to empower it to decide all related issues."' Justice Minton
wrote the Court's opinion avoiding a decision with respect to whether or
not an ex parte divorce decree denying alimony, obtained by the husband,
must be given full faith and credit in a subsequent action brought by the
wife, by holding that the first state had not ruled on alimony so that the
second state was free to do so. 46' But following his retirement the Court
did hold that an ex parte decree denying alimony is void,4"' just as a
money judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant." 5
In 111fay v. Anderson"6 the Court reached the same result with re-
spect to custody decrees, holding void a Wisconsin decree awarding cus-
tody to the father made without personal jurisdiction over the mother, on
the ground that "rights far more precious to appellant than property
rights will be cut off if she is to be bound by the Wisconsin award of
457. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
458. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) ; see Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
459. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
460. Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952).
461. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
462. Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 H~Av. L. REv. 1287 (1951).
463. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568 (1956).
464. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); cf. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S.
541 (1948).
465. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
466. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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custody. ' 467  Characterizing this reasoning as a "cardiac considera-
tion,"4 " Justice Jackson dissented, urging that the welfare of the children
outweighed the mother's "rights," and that Wisconsin's interest in such
welfare, where both the father and the children were domiciled there,
was sufficient to give it jurisdiction.469  Justice Minton dissented sepa-
rately on the ground that the wife's pleadings in the subsequent proceed-
ing in Ohio had failed to challenge the Wisconsin decree so that the
question decided by the Court was not properly before it. 70
Still another interesting feature of the case was the suggestion in
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, "interpreting" the majority
opinion as holding only that Ohio was not bound by the *Wisconsin de-
cree, that the Wisconsin decree was not void, and that Ohio was free to
recognize it or not.471  A similar intermediate position was subsequently
adopted by Justice Harlan in dissent with respect to an ex parte decree
denying alimony.7
2
Justice Minton's views with respect to ex parte alimony and custody
decrees are difficult to ascertain since in both cases in which he partici-
pated, he based his conclusion on non-constitutional grounds. His ap-
parent desire to avoid constitutional decisions is typical of the Court as
a whole over the years. 3
B. JURISDICTION OF STATES OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
The states have frequently sought to regulate and tax concerns which
distribute their products in the state without establishing a permanent
base of operations there. Usually such attempts have been attacked on
the dual grounds that they violate the commerce clause and the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The latter constitutional
provision is also often relied upon by such corporations to resist attempts
by local consumers and businessmen to instigate litigation against them
in local courts.
Whether a state has jurisdiction over such a foreign corporation for
a particular purpose depends upon whether the contacts of the corpora-
tion with the state are sufficient to give the state power to assert such
jurisdiction without being fundamentally unfair to the corporation.
When a corporation distributes its products in a manner such that it can
467. Id. at 533.
468. Id. at 540 (dissenting opinion).
469. Id. at 536-42 (dissenting opinion).
470. Id. at 542-43 (dissenting opinion).
471. Id. at 535-36 (concurring opinion); cf. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
472. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 428-35 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
473. See, e.g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1953).
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reasonably anticipate that they will reach consumers in another state, it
is arguable that it is not fundamentally unfair for that state to regulate
and tax its activities and to require it to submit to litigation instituted by
local citizens, at least with respect to activities and transactions which
have a local impact. But because a "state may not project itself beyond
its borders,"474 "due process requires . . . that in order to submit a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the ter-
ritory of the forum, he have certain contacts with it such that the main-
tenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' ""' In a 5-4 decision in Travelers Health Ass'n v.
Virginia7 6 the Court sustained a Virginia cease and desist order against
a Nebraska insurance company doing business by mail where service had
been made solely by registered mail addressed to the company's Nebraska
office. Justice Minton dissented urging:
An in personam judgment cannot be based upon service by reg-
istered letter on a nonresident corporation or a natural person,
neither of whom has ever been within the State of Virginia....
Service by registered mail is said by the majority to be
sufficient where the corporation has "minimum contacts" with
the state of the forum. How many "contacts" a corporation or
person must have before being subjected to suit we are not in-
formed. Here all of appellants' contacts with the residents of
Virginia were by mail. No agent of appellant corporation has
entered the State, nor has the individual appellant. The con-
tracts were made wholly in Nebraska. Under these circum-
stances, I would hold that appellants were never "present" in
Virginia.
As I understand the International Shoe Co. case, the mini-
mum contacts which a corporation has in the State must be
"activities of the corporation's agent within the state." There
were such contacts by agents within the State in that case. Serv-
ice was made, in addition to notice by registered letter, by per-
sonal service within the State upon one of those agents. Serv-
ice on an agent within the jurisdiction would seem to me indis-
pensable to a judgment against a corporation. It would seem
to be an a fortiori proposition that judgment could not be ob-
474. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944).
475. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
476. 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
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tained against a natural person who was not available for per-
sonal service."'
His position was not unlike that subsequently adopted by a 5-4 majority
in Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland.8 striking down, on due process
grounds, Maryland's attempt to require a Delaware seller to collect its
use tax. Another illustration of the conflicting views appeared in a case
involving a libel suit brought in Florida by a local resident against the
publisher of Look Magazine."' Although Justice Minton's majority
opinion was based on a question of venue, the dissent was devoted en-
tirely to supporting the trial court's jurisdiction.
A recent case following Justice Minton's retirement again upheld
the existence of state jurisdiction over foreign insurance companies do-
ing business by mail, holding that such a company may be sued in Cali-
fornia in an action relating to a policy which was delivered in California,
when premiums were also mailed from there and the deceased lived there
when he died. 80 However, a subsequent 5-4 decision reaffirmed the ex-
istence of some constitutional limits on the exercise of jurisdiction over
a foreign corporation by holding invalid a Florida judgment with re-
spect to a trust on the ground that Florida had no jurisdiction over the
Delaware corporate trustee.48'
The Court's decisions sustaining jurisdiction over foreign insurance
companies emphasize not so much the states' contacts with the corpora-
tion as the local activities of the policyholders and the states' interest in
protecting them. In his dissent in the Travelers Health case, Justice Min-
ton made it clear that for him this was not enough.
C. PROCEDURE IN FEDERAL COURTS
1. Jurisdiction and Venue. The problem of jurisdiction, particu-
larly over foreign corporations, was often presented in federal courts in
much the same form as in state courts. While in many cases the plaintiff
can sue in either a state or federal court,482 even if he chooses a state
court, the defendant can have the action removed to a federal court. 83
Whether the action is brought in federal court by the plaintiff or removed
to it by the defendant, the jurisdiction of the federal court is ordinarily
477. Id. at 658-59 (dissenting opinion).
478. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
479. Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663 (1953).
480. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
481. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
482. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Supp. V, 1958).
483. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1952).
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limited to the borders of the state in which it is located.484 In a libel suit
by a Florida resident against the publisher of Look Magazine, brought in
a Florida court and removed by the defendant to a federal court, the
court of appeals had affirmed dismissal of the action485 on the ground
that the federal court lacked jurisdiction because Look was not "doing
business" in Florida within the meaning of the federal venue statute ap-
plicable to actions brought in federal courts.486 In an opinion by Justice
Black, three members of the Court seized this opportunity to urge that
Look was doing sufficient business in Florida to justify suit against it in
Florida for jurisdictional and venue purposes."' However, Justice Min-
ton wrote the Court's opinion reversing on a different and less contro-
versial ground. Noting that this was a removed action governed by a
different venue statute,488 he held that venue was properly laid in the
federal district court embracing the area in which the state court was
located.
In circumstances such as those described above, in the past a federal
court might dismiss such an action under the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens even though it had jurisdiction. Since such a dismissal might
result in very harsh consequences for the plaintiff, in 1948 Congress
authorized transfer, rather than dismissal, of the action "to any other
district or division where it might have been brought" "for the con-
venience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice."48  Justice
Minton wrote the Court's opinion in an important 5-3 decision in Nor-
wood v. Kirkpatrick490 holding that this statute gave the district court in
which the action was brought broader discretion to transfer actions than
had previously existed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens for
dismissal of actions. Justice Minton reasoned that:
When Congress adopted § 1404(a), it intended to do more
than just codify the existing law on forum non conveniens. As
this Court said in Ex parte Collett . . . Congress, in writing
§ 1404(a), which was an entirely new section, was revising as
well as codifying. The harshest result of the application of the
old doctrine of forum non conveniens, dismissal of the action,
484. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) ; Note, Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts over
Foreign Corporations, 69 HARv. L. REv. 508 (1956).
485. Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 197 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1952).
486. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1952).
487. Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 667-72 (1953) (concurring
opinion).
488. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1952).
489. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952); see Note, Limitations on the Transfer of Actions
under the Nuicial Code, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1347 (1951).
490. 349 U.S. 29 (1955).
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was eliminated by the provision in § 1404(a) for transfer.
When the harshest part of the doctrine is excised by statute, it
can hardly be called mere codification. As a consequence, we
believe that Congress, by the term "for the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice," intended to
permit courts to grant transfers upon a lesser showing of in-
convenience. This is not to say that the relevant factors have
changed or that the plaintiff's choice of forum is not to be con-
sidered, but only that the discretion to be exercised is broader.49'
Although the dissenters appear correct in asserting that this decision
limits the plaintiff's "right" to choose the forum, the result provides de-
sirable flexibility which, by enhancing the usefulness of this remedial
statute, should improve the administration of justice in federal courts.
Justice Minton also wrote the Court's opinion disposing of the com-
plicated procedural tangle which arose following a state administrative
award of damages in a railroad's condemnation suit.492 The railroad
appealed both to a federal district court and to a state court, and it re-
moved the latter action from the state court to the federal court. The
Court held that the appeal directly to the federal court was unauthorized
and properly dismissed, although two Justices urged that the appeal
should be treated as an original action over which the federal court had
diversity jurisdiction.49 The Court also held that the railroad could not
remove the other appeal from the state court to the federal court. Jus-
tice Minton reasoned that only a defendant can remove an action under
the federal statute, and that the railroad was the plaintiff for purposes
of the federal removal statute, even though it was treated as the defend-
ant under state law. Consistent with his position in other cases that
the state's characterization was not conclusive for purposes of interpret-
ing the federal statute, he urged that:
For the purpose of removal, the federal law determines
who is plaintiff and who is defendant. It is a question of the
construction of the federal statute on removal, and not the
state statute. The latter's procedural provisions cannot control
the privilege of removal granted by the federal statute. . .
Here the railroad is the plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a)
and cannot remove.49
491. Id. at 32.
492. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1954).
493. Id. at 582-84, 584-86 (concurring opinions).
494. Id. at 580.
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Another jurisdictional problem resulted from the attempt of a dis-
charged Government employee to sue the Civil Service Commission in a
federal court in Louisiana by serving the United States District Attorney
and the Regional Director of the Civil Service Region. 95 Justice Minton
wrote the Court's opinion holding that since the Civil Service Commis-
sion was not a suable corporate entity, suit must be brought against the
Commissioners individually who must be served personally to obtain
jurisdiction over them.
Sometimes the jurisdictional question related to the subject matter
of, rather than the parties to, the action. For example, Justice Minton
wrote for a unanimous court holding that a federal district court has
jurisdiction over an action based on the plaintiff's claim that a state
statute unconstitutionally denied it equal protection of the laws, even
though the state court had not yet interpreted the statute.4 9 6
These cases, of which Norwood v. Kirkpatrick is probably the only
one of lasting significance, are but a small sampling illustrating the wide
variety of jurisdictional problems which may arise in federal courts.
Perhaps due to his service as a court of appeals judge, Justice Minton's
opinions demonstrate a broad understanding of jurisdictional problems
in federal courts and a preference for improving the administration of
justice in them.
2. Withdrawal of Case from Jury. A problem which has increas-
ingly plagued the Court involves the circumstances in which a trial court
may direct a verdict for the defendant, particularly in actions under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act,497 thereby taking the case away from
the jury. The Court's current policy, over strong protests, especially
from Justice Frankfurter,"' appears to be to grant certiorari in every
such case, and on the merits, at least one court of appeals has con-
cluded,49 to require that no FELA case be taken from the jury. With
respect to the merits in such cases, Justice Minton pursued a middle
ground depending on the facts of the case. Thus, while he joined in one
decision reversing a directed verdict for the defendant,"' he wrote the
Court's opinion sustaining judgment n.o.v. for the defendant railroad in
a FELA suit where he concluded that there was no evidence of negligence
495. Blackman v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512 (1952).
496. Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485 (1956).
497. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952).
498. E.g., Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 524-58 (1957)
(dissenting opinion) ; see Note, Supreme Court Certiorari Policy in Cases Arising Under
the FELA, 69 HAkv. L. Ruv. 1441 (1956).
499. See Gibson v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 246 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1957).
500. Stone v. New York Cent. & St. L.R.R., 344 U.S. 407 (1953).
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by the defendant. 1  While Justices Black and Douglas urged that "the
taking of this verdict from petitioner is a totally unwarranted substitu-
tion of a court's view of the evidence for that of a jury,"5"2 Justice
Minton concluded that:
True, it is the jury's function to credit or discredit all or
part of the testimony. But disbelief of the engineer's testimony
would not supply a proof. . . Nor would the possibility alone
that the jury might disbelieve the engineer's version make the
case submissible to it.
The burden was upon petitioner to prove that decedent fell
after the train stopped without warning, which was the act of
negligence she charged. Her evidence showed he fell before the
train stopped."0 '
3. Appellate Review. In a similar case brought under the Jones
Act.. 4 the defendant had moved for a directed verdict, decision upon
which was reserved until after the jury rendered a verdict for the plain-
tiff, at which time the trial court denied both this motion and defendant's
post-verdict motion "to set aside the verdict." '  Upon appeal the court
of appeals reversed the denial of the motion for a directed verdict and
directed the trial court to enter judgment for the defendant.00 How-
ever, the Court held 5-4 that the court of appeals lacked power to direct
the entry of judgment for the defendant, and that the defendant was
entitled only to a new trial, because the defendant's post-verdict motion
had "failed to comply with permission given by [Federal Rule] 50 (b)
to move for judgment n.o.v. after the verdict." '  Justice Minton joined
Justice Frankfurter's dissent which urged that the decision emphasized
form over substance and put a premium on redundant ritual which de-
feats the liberal purpose of the rule.0 ' Justice Minton also dissented
separately.00 urging that the judgment of the court of appeals was author-
ized by a then recent statute which empowered federal appellate courts,
upon reversal of any judgment, "to direct the entry of such appropriate
judgment . . . as may be just under the circumstances." 1 ' He had
501. Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 340 U.S. 573 (1951).
502. Id. at 580 (dissenting opinion).
503. Id. at 576.
504. 38 Stat. 1185 (1915), as amended, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1952).
505. Johnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 48, 59 (1952).
506. Johnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 194 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1952).
507. Johnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 48, 54 (1952).
508. Id. at 54-62 (dissenting opinion).
509. Id. at 65 (dissenting opinion).
510. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1952).
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earlier relied on the same statute in his opinion for the Court sustaining
the judgment of the court of appeals directing a new trial in a criminal
case upon reversal of the defendant's conviction. 1'
Justice Minton wrote the Court's opinion in another case involving
factual issues, reversing the court of appeals, and holding that the district
court's judgment for the plaintiff was not "clearly erroneous. ' 12 Again
Justice Minton analyzed the testimony, this time concluding that there
was sufficient evidence of causal negligence to support a judgment for
the plaintiff :
On evidence showing these facts, including the opinion of
the experts, we think there was substantial evidence from which
the District Court could and did find that respondent was negli-
gent in permitting these Chinese, from the infested area of
Shanghai, to have the run of the ship and use of its facilities,
and in furnishing the crude and exposed latrine provided on the
deck of the ship, by reason whereof the petitioner contracted
polio.
Of course no one can say with certainty that the Chinese
were the carriers of the polio virus and that they communicated
it to the petitioner. But upon balance of the probabilities it
seems a reasonable inference for the District Court to make
from the facts proved, supported as they were by the best judg-
ment medical experts have'upon the subject today, the petitioner
was contaminated by the Chinese who came aboard the ship
November 11, 1945, at Shanghai. Certainly we cannot say on
review that a judgment based upon such evidence is clearly
erroneous. 
513
While the foregoing decision indicates a willingness on the part of
Justice Minton and the Court to give great weight to the factual conclu-
sions of the trial court, he and the Court were equally insistent that those
conclusions be based upon evidence in the record. Thus, he wrote the
Court's opinion reversing a decision of the Court of Claims because it
had relied on facts outside the record. 14 He concluded:
Thus the case was decided not only upon what was alleged
in the pleadings but upon other allegations as well, as to which
no clear inkling appears in the record. Because the Court of
511. Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950).
512. McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19 (1954).
513. Id. at 22-23.
514. Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. v. United States, 339 U.S. 157 (1950).
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Claims considered these additional allegations, it is urged that
we should also consider them. But we cannot consider such al-
legations in determining the sufficiency of the cause stated.
After all, pleadings and the making of a proper record have not
been dispensed with. They still have a function to perform.
This case points up that function. We will not review questions
not clearly raised on the record. 15
4. Post-Jidgment Relief. Just as in criminal cases, sometimes the
losing party in civil litigation seeks another chance. Federal Rule 60 (b)
authorizes each district court to relieve a party from a final judgment on
several specific grounds or for "any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment." '16  Justice Minton wrote the Court's
opinion refusing to vacate a denaturalization decree four years after the
time for appeal had expired where the petitioners alleged that they had
failed to do so in reliance in part on advice of an immigration officer."'
To Justice Minton the controlling consideration was that "there must be
an end to litigation someday, and free, calculated deliberate choices are
not to be relieved from." '
Unlike some of his colleagues, Justice Minton's votes and opinions
with respect to procedural problems such as these were not influenced
primarily by a desire to protect the supposed rights of one of the parties,
usually the plaintiff. Within the scope of the applicable statutes and
rules, he consistently took positions which conferred considerable discre-
tion on both trial and appellate courts and which promoted the administra-
tion of justice in the federal courts. His emphasis on bringing an end to
litigation was consistent with the latter goal.
D. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
Congress has delegated much of the responsibility for administering
many of its far-flung regulatory schemes to administrative agencies, and
a startling proportion of the volume of the Court's business entails re-
view of action taken by such agencies. The two procedural questions
which recur most frequently relate to the type of hearing required in the
administrative proceedings and the nature of and extent to which review
of the administrative action is available in the federal courts.
1. The Type of Hearing Available. In a federal criminal trial the
Constitution ensures the defendant the right to a full-fledged jury trial,
515. Id. at 160.
516. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (6).
517. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950).
518. Id. at 198; cf. Callanan Road Improvement Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 507
(1953).
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except in unusual proceedings such as contempt cases. In administrative
proceedings, such as those involving exclusion or deportation of aliens,
which bear some relationship to criminal trials, the Court has repeatedly
been required to determine the extent to which Congress had limited, or
could limit or even do away with, a hearing for the individual resisting
the Government's assertion of power.519
a. Alien Deportation and Exclusion Proceedings. The federal
government possesses and exercises broad power in directing the depor-
tation of aliens. A prospective deportee who claims that he does not fall
within any deportable class is ordinarily entitled to a hearing on his
claim."' In 1950 Justice Minton joined in a decision. 2' holding that de-
portation hearings were subject to the hearing requirements of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 22 but he also joined in a subsequent deci-
sion522 holding that the separation of functions provisions of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act52. had been made inapplicable to deportation
hearings by the 1952 Immigration Act.525
Some relief for aliens found deportable was afforded by statutory
provisions conferring discretion on the Attorney General not to deport
such an alien. 2 Implementing this and other provisions, the Attorney
General set up a Board of Appeals to hear requests for such relief. 7 On
the ground that the statute put the matter solely in the discretion of the
Attorney General, Justice Minton joined in a dissent from a decision
holding that petitioner could not be denied such relief if, as he claimed,
the Attorney General had influenced the Board of Appeals by putting
petitioner's name on a special list of aliens to be deported. 8  Subse-
quently he was in the majority holding with respect to the same alien that
such discretionary relief could be denied where it had been found as a
fact that the Board of Appeals was not influenced by the Attorney
General's action.2 9  He also joined in a decision holding that the hearing
519. See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); CAB
v. State Airlines, Inc., 338 U.S. 572 (1950) ; Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949) ; Da-
vis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1956).
520. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
521. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
522. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1952).
523. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
524. 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(a) (1952).
525. 66 Stat. 210 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)--(1952) ; see 64 Stat. 1048 (1950).
526. 39 Stat. 889 (1917), as amended, 54 Stat. 671 (1940), 56 Stat. 1044 (1942),
62 Stat. 1206 (1948) ; see 66 Stat. 214 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §,1354 (1952).
527. 8 C.F.R. § 6.1 (1958).
528. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
529. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955).
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officer may rely on confidential information in denying such discre-
tionary relief."'
An alien resisting deportation is ordinarily entitled to a hearing,
even though the foregoing cases illustrate that it may be more limited
than a criminal trial. Far less fortunate is an alien seeking entry to this
country for the first time. In United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaugh-
nessy.3 Justice Minton wrote another of his most important and most
sharply criticized opinions, holding that an alien seeking admission to this
country under the "War Brides Act.32 may be excluded without a hearing.
The War Brides Act authorized admission of the alien spouse of a
veteran without compliance with quota or physical and mental limitations
if he or she was "otherwise admissible under the immigration laws." '
Justice Minton held that to be otherwise admissible, an alien must com-
ply with securtiy regulations relating to immigrants which did and con-
stitutionally could authorize exclusion on the basis of confidential in-
formation without a hearing. This decision results in an ultimate re-
striction on procedural protections, complete denial of any hearing. Here,
however, the Government was not attempting to reach out and affirma-
tively deprive Mrs. Knauf of her freedom, but simply to keep her from
coming into this country in the first instance. As Justice Minton said:
At the outset we wish to point out that an alien who seeks
admission to this country may not do so under any claim of
right. Admission of aliens to the United States is a privilege
granted by the sovereign United States Government. Such
privilege is granted to an alien only upon such terms as the
United States shall prescribe. It must be exercised in accord-
ance with the procedure which the United States provides.
The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of
sovereignty. The right to do so stems not alone from legislative
power but is inherent in the executive power to control the
foreign affairs of the nation.
Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is
due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."3
In Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding... Justice Minton was the lone dis-
senter from a decision holding that an alien who was seeking reentry
530. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
531. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
532. 59 Stat. 659 (1945).
533. Ibid.
534. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542-44 (1950).
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after having spent his entire time of departure on an American ship was
entitled to a hearing. The limited applicability of this decision was
clearly illustrated later in the same term in Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Meze.. 6 in which Justice Minton joined in a 5-4 decision holding
that an alien who had lived here 28 years and left to visit his dying
mother could, upon his return, be excluded and detained indefinitely
without a hearing.
The Knauf and Mezei cases have been severely criticized. Justice
Minton's statement to the effect that any procedure authorized by Con-
gress is due process for an entering alien has been described as "a
patently preposterous proposition."5 7  It would be no answyer for this
critic that the proposition did not originate with Justice Minton since
Justice Minton's application of this "harsh precept" "ignore[s] the pain-
ful forward steps of a whole half century of adjudication, making no
effort to relate what then is being done to what the Court has done
before," "as if nothing had happened in the years between."" 8'
But conceding, as seems clear, that the Constitution does not stop at
the shore line, it is still the whole Constitution and not merely the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. For example, shortly before
Justice Minton joined the Court, it held, in an opinion by Justice Black,
that under the war power, even a resident alien could be deported without
a hearing.539 The question in these cases is again one of power-whether
or not the Constitution expressly or by implication has conferred power
on Congress and the President to exclude entering aliens without a hear-
ing. In the Knauff case Justice Minton answered the question in the
affirmative, relying heavily on earlier decisions of the Court.5 40 But
even if Knauff is correct, Justice Minton's position in Kwong Hai Chew
and Mezei is questionable. An alien seeking reentry after long residence
in this country is in most respects more like a deportee than an alien
seeking entry for the first time. To hold that his procedural rights are
substantially less than those of a deportee who entered the country il-
legally requires reliance on arbitrary geographical concepts rather than
on sovereign power conferred on the executive in the conduct of foreign
relations. Moreover, even if such an alien may be excluded without a
535. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
536. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
537. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. Rzv. 1362, 1392 (1953).
538. Id. at 1391, 1396; see also Developments in the Law-Immigration and Na-
tioiality, 66 HARv. L. Rxv. 643, 671-76 (1953).
539. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957).
540. E.g., Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
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hearing, it is hard to reconcile the indefinite detention of Mezei with any
concept of fundamental fairness. It is one thing to bar an alien's entry
and quite another to hold him prisoner indefinitely.
b. Selective Service Exemptions. The continuing international
crisis has necessitated a comprehensive system for mobilization of mili-
tary manpower. The exemption of ministers5 " and conscientious ob-
jectors 42 from these requirements of military service has created diffi-
cult factual problems as to the truth of claims to such an exemption.
Congress provided for an Appeal Board to resolve such factual disputes,
and, to aid this board in reaching a decision with respect to claimed con-
scientious objectors, it has also required an FBI investigation and an ad-
visory Justice Department recommendation, following a "hearing." 43
In United States v. Nugent"' Justice Minton joined the opinion of
the Court holding that the statutory requirement for a "hearing" does
not require disclosure to the registrant of the FBI report but only a sum-
mary of it. Two subsequent "draft dodging" convictions were reversed,
the first because such a summary had not been furnished to the registrant
for use at the Justice Department hearing, 5 and the latter because the
Justice Department's recommendation had not been made available to the
defendant in connection with the proceedings before the Appeal Board.4 '
Justice Minton dissented in both of these cases on the basis of his belief,
discussed below, that the scope of review of draft board classifications
is extremely limited.
The problem in these cases is quite different from that relating to
excluded aliens or civilians tried by court-martial. In those cases Con-
gress had provided either for no hearing at all or for one different from
that customary for civilian criminal defendants. Here, however, Con-
gress had provided for a hearing, and in the absence of any clear statu-
tory limitations, the same policy of developing the truth which required
production of the informer's statements in the Jencks and Gordon cases
would require production of the FBI report and the Justice Department
recommendation. Of course, it may be that portions of the report would
contain material which, in the interest of national security, should not
be revealed, but the answer would seem to be to exclude those portions
and not the entire report. It is difficult to see how such full disclosure
would result in greater interference with selective service procedures
541. 62 Stat. 611 (1952), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(g) (1952).
542. 62 Stat. 613 (1952), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1952).
543. Ibid.
544. 346 U.S. 1 (1953).
545. Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955).
546. Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955).
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"geared to meet the imperative needs of mobilization and national vigil-
ance"54 than disclosure of a truly fair summary. The limitations on a
hearing which Justice Minton voted to sustain in the alien and civilian
court-martial cases can be justified on the ground that Congress had
power to impose them on the basis of its expressed belief that other con-
siderations outweighed the individual's right to maximum development
of the truth. But where, as in the selective service cases, Congress has
provided for a hearing, Justice Minton and the Court were not justified in
imposing unnecessary limitations on the development of the truth in
that hearing.
2. Right to and Scope of Review. a. Standing and Ripeness for
Review. To have standing to obtain judicial review of an administrative
order, the party seeking review must have been adversely affected by the
order. In Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia548 the Virginia Corpora-
tion Commission had directed a Nebraska insurance company to cease
solicitation of or sales to Virginia residents until it obtained authority
from the Commission pursuant to the Virginia "Blue Sky Law." '
Justice Minton, dissenting, urged that the company was not entitled to
review of the order because the order carried no sanctions. He urged that:
The Commission has in no way attempted to enforce the order
issued by the Commission against appellants. Therefore ap-
pellants have not been hurt, and the question of due process is
not reached. In the scheme of the statute, publicity appears to
be the sole sanction of § 6. I know of no reason why Virginia
may not go through this shadow-boxing performance in order
to publicize the activities of appellants in Virginia and notify
its citizens that appellants have not qualified under the Securi-
ties Law.5 '
His treatment of the Commission's order as a publicity release is con-
sistent with his position in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm'n v. Mc-
Grath551 in which he joined a dissent which similarly characterized the
Attorney-General's list of subversive organizations and would have
dismissed the appeal of a listed organization as not ripe for review.
547. United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
548. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
549. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-501-27 (1950).
550. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1950) (dissenting
opinion).
551. 341 U.S. 123, 202-05 (1951) (dissenting opinion); but cf. Adler v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (where Justice Minton's majority opinion did not discuss a
similar problem although it was the basis of a lengthy dissenting opinion) ; see Davis,
Ripeness of Governmental Action for .udicial Review, 68 HARv. L. Rxv. 1122, 1336
(1955).
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b. Right to Review. In some instances the right to judicial review
of administrative action is limited or abrogated by statute. A number of
statutes provide that the administrative determination shall be "final."
To Justice Minton "final" meant just that and precluded judicial review,
at least under ordinary circumstances. For example, in a similar type
of case he wrote the Court's opinion holding that where a government
contract makes the decision of the agency head final, his decision is not
reviewable in the absence of fraud on his part.552 The Court was faced
with a number of other cases requiring determination of the meaning and
validity of statutory limitations on the scope of review of selective service
exemptions and alien deportation and exclusion orders.
With respect to Mrs. Knauff's exclusion order made without a hear-
ing, Justice Minton said: "The action of the executive officer under such
authority is final and conclusive. Whatever the rule may be concerning
deportation of persons who have gained entry into the United States, it is
not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law,
to review the determination of the political branch of the Government to
exclude a given alien.""5 3 It has been pointed out that this is not a com-
plete answer to the entrant's challenge to the exclusion order since a
limited form of review is available by habeas corpus. 4 But it is clear
that to Justice Minton review by habeas corpus raised solely a question
of power which, whether rightly or wrongly, he thought Congress pos-
sessed with respect to entering aliens. His opinion in Knauff is strik-
ingly similar to his concurring opinion in a court-martial case, Burns v.
Wilson,"' and in each instance he denied the Court's power to extend the
scope of review by the federal courts beyond determination of the juris-
diction of the tribunal which made the order challenged.
Similarly, he joined in an opinion"' holding that where Congress
had provided that the administrative determination in a deportation pro-
ceeding should be "final, '5 7 review was unavailable under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act which excepted from its review requirements ad-
ministrative orders review of which was expressly precluded by statute.558
After re-enactment of the immigration laws in 1952,"' 9 the Court reached
the contrary result, although Justice Minton's dissent seems correct in
552. United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
553. United States ex reL. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950).
554. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1952) ; see Hart, supra note 537, at 1391.
555. 346 U.S. 137, 147 (1953) (concurring opinion).
556. Heikklda v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
557. 39 Stat. 889 (1917), as amended, 54 Stat. 1238 (1940).
558. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952).
559. 66 Stat. 210 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1952).
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concluding from the legislative history that in re-enacting the immigra-
tion statutes Congress intended no change in the scope of review."'
Justice Minton's views with respect to the review of the classifica-
tion of alleged conscientious objectors and ministers, and review of their
criminal convictions for refusing to submit to induction, were quite simi-
lar to those he maintained in interpreting the statutes relating to review
of alien deportation and exclusion orders. In Estep v. United States)6'
decided before his appointment to the Court, where Congress had pro-
vided that the draft board classification should be "final, ' 562 the Court
held that a registrant who refused to submit to induction could challenge
his classification at his subsequent trial "only if there is no basis in fact
for the classification which it gave the registrant" in which case "its
action would be lawless and beyond its jurisdiction.""56 When the Court
subsequently upset a conviction in Dickinson v. United States56'" on the
ground that the defendant had made out a prima facie case as a minister,
Justice Minton joined a dissent which urged that this was a factual dis-
pute rather than a question of jurisdiction. He later dissented separately
in three decisions upsetting similar convictions of claimed conscientious
objectors on the basis of a variety of failures by those administering the
selective service machinery to follow the statutory requirements." 5  As
an original matter, the Estep decision may well have been wrong in ig-
noring the Congressional command that the draft board classification is
"final." Certainly it does not kill the spirit of the statute to hold that
"final" means just that and not "almost final" or "final, except." More-
over, even accepting that decision, the dissenters in the Dickinson case ap-
pear correct in concluding that the Court had extended the scope of re-
view far beyond "jurisdictional" issues to disputed factual questions.
But in two of the subsequent cases, Justice Minton dissented in reliance
on the Estep decision on the ground that the Board's decision was rea-
sonable even if erroneous.566 Since those cases involved errors of law,
the Estep decision would not appear to preclude review, however honest
560. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
561. 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
562. 54 Stat. 893 (1940); see 62 Stat. 620 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §
460(b) (1952).
563. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122, 121 (1946).
564. 346 U.S. 389 (1953).
565. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955) ; Simmons v. United States,
348 U.S. 397 (1955); Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955); cf. Witmer v.
United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955).
566. Simmons v. United States, supra note 565; Gonzales v. United States, supra
note 565. In Sicurella v. United States, supra note 565, the principal basis of his dissent
rested on interpretation of the statutory exemption for conscientious objectors.
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the Board's decision, and however debatable the question of law may
have been.
The cases involving the right to a hearing and to review by the courts
of decisions in proceedings closely akin to ordinary criminal trials in-
volve a number of important problems. Fundamental, of course, were
again issues of power. With respect to entering aliens Justice Minton
took the position that whatever procedure Congress provided is due
process, just as he did with respect to court-martial convictions of mili-
tary personnel. As to both entering aliens, and deportable aliens request-
ing discretionary relief, he emphasized, as he did in the Adler case, that
the person aggrieved was claiming a privilege rather than a right."' This
analysis supported his position that the Attorney-General's discretion to
grant relief to deportable aliens is unfettered, which is also closely akin
to his view in the contempt cases upholding the power of the trial court
despite its apparent prejudice."' Conceding both that privileges were
involved and that the distinction is meaningful, it is not a complete
answer.560  Even in conferring privileges, the requirement of funda-
mental fairness embodied in the due process clause would ordinarily
preclude arbitrary governmental action except where unusual circum-
stances bring other constitutional provisions into play, particularly in
proceedings which inherently involve a stigma closely akin to criminal
guilt."' Thus, it is easy to sympathize with those who protested against
decisions based on the secret statements of "confidential informants,"
or, depending on one's outlook, "faceless informers." 7 ' But it is not the
Court's function to pass on the wisdom of such a policy, and the basic
question of power is often an extremely difficult one the answer to which
depends upon a delicate balancing of important competing considerations
and constitutional powers.
c. Scope of Review. With respect to review of administrative fac-
tual determinations Justice Minton joined the Court's opinion in Univer-
sal Camera Corp. v. NLRB.72 holding that the agency's findings must be
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. However,
567. Compare United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950),
with United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954) (dissenting
opinion), and Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
568. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) ; Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S.
11 (1954).
569. See Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HIv. L. REv. 193,
222-80 (1956).
570. See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
571. See Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 376 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
572. 340 U.S. 474 (1951); see also NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U.S. 498
(1951); Jafee, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record;" 64 HARv.
L. REv. 1233 (1951).
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the dichotomy between questions of fact and questions of law is not al-
ways as clear in practice as it sounds in principle. For example, in a
companion case Justice Minton dissented from the Court's opinion hold-
ing that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that an em-
ployee who drowned in a rescue attempt from his employer's water recre-
ational area was acting in the scope of his employment.57 Justice Minton
apparently concluded that the basic facts established as a matter of law
that the employee was outside the scope of his employment, urging that:
This finding is false and has no scintilla of evidence or infer-
ence to support it.
I am unable to understand how this Court can say this is a
fact based upon evidence. It is undisputed upon this record that
the deceased, at the time he met his death, was outside the
recreational area in the performance of a voluntary act of at-
tempted rescue of someone unknown to the record. There can
be no inference of liability here unless liability follows from the
mere relationship of employer and employee. The attempt to
rescue was an isolated, voluntary act of bravery of the deceased
in no manner arising out of or in the course of his employment.
The only relation his employment had with the attempted rescue
and the following death was that his employment put him on
the Island of Guam.574
Sometimes the propriety of an administrative factual finding is in-
terwoven with a challenge to the power of the agency to take particular
action. For example, in reviewing an I.C.C. order fixing the points at
which line-haul service to particular plants ended, Justice Minton wrote
the Court's opinion holding "that the Commission has the power to fix
the point at which line-haul or carrier service begins and ends" '75 and that
"there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings that
the convenient points for the beginning and end of line-haul were at the
interchange tracks." '76  In this case as in a number of others where ad-
ministrative action (whether by legislative regulation or judicial decision)
was challenged on the ground it was contrary to or unauthorized by the
applicable statute, Justice Minton consistently voted to sustain the power
asserted by the agency on the ground that the action taken was within
the discretion delegated to it by Congress. Perhaps his most important
573. O'Leary v. Brown-Pac.-iMaxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951).
574. Id. at 509 (dissenting opinion) ; cf. Thompson v. Lawson, 347 U.S. 334 (1954).
575. United States v. United States Smelting Refining & Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186,
197 (1950).
576. Id. at 194.
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opinion of this nature was in Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Con-
ference.77 sustaining the regulations promulgated by the Civil Service
Commission with respect to hearing examiners. By rejecting conten-
tions that all examiners in a particular agency must be of the same grade
and must be assigned to cases in mechanical rotation without regard to
the nature of the case or the competence or experience of the examiner,
he sustained the Commission's power to provide desirable flexibility and
thereby enhance the efficiency of the administrative processes. His def-
erence to the administrative expertise underlying the Commission's regu-
lations is illustrated by his observation that "these specifications of neces-
sity must be subjective. They are not based so much on evidence as on
judgment. It is a discriminating judgment and one Congress committed
to the experience and expertise of the Civil Service Commission, not
the Courts."""8
Similarly, in the Court's opinion upholding an ICC rate order estab-
lishing a barge rate lower than the comparable rail rate, even though
there was no cost justification for the difference, Justice Minton rea-
soned that:
Neither the Commission nor this Court has held that lesser
cost of service is a finding without which the Commission may
not fix a charge, division of rate, or differential. On the other
hand, the considerations just discussed were rightly taken into
account by the Commission. We must not lose sight of the fact
that the Commission has the interests of shippers and coh-
sumers to safeguard as well as those of the carriers. . . . The
accommodation of the factors entering into rate structures, in-
cluding competition, is a task peculiarly for the Commission."
Deference to the administrative judgment also underlay his opinion
for the Court, sustaining an ICC order providing a separate switching
tariff applicable to livestock but not to other types of freight, where
he said:
The huge quantities of dead freight which are handled and the
restricted facilities of Ashland Yards have resulted in the de-
velopment, over a period of seventy years, of a complicated, in-
tricate pattern of operation. For this reason, any attempt to
change the pattern calls for the most expert consideration and
administrative judgment-a task that courts are ill-fitted to
577. 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
578. Id. at 137.
579. Alabama G.S.R.R. v. United States, 340 U.S. 216, 223-24 (1951).
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perform. If the Commission gave weight to the relevant fac-
tors, its decision should not be overturned ...
. . . Whether the system for the delivery of livestock into
Chicago which has existed for over seventy years at an estab-
lished line-haul rate, and which has recognized definite termi-
nals calling for a minimum of train movements in a highly
congested area, should be displaced by another system which
would further complicate the operations and would necessitate
the use of properties and services not included when the present
line-haul rates and terminals were fixed, is a question com-
mitted to the administrative judgment of the Commission.
When that judgment is based on findings abundantly sup-
ported by the evidence on the whole record, as it is in this case,
it is the duty of the courts to sustain it.580
He took much the same position in dissenting from the Court's de-
cision upsetting ICC railroad tariff provisions absolving railroads from
liability for stated percentages of damage to eggs.58' The Court held that
the Commission's findings were insufficient to support its conclusions
that these percentages represented the damage ordinarily incurred in the
shipment of eggs without fault of the carrier. Justice Minton dissented,
saying:
I think the Commission had the power to promulgate regula-
tions prescribing, after full hearing, a reasonable deduction for
loss due to the inherent defects of the commodity transported.
The nature of the commodity and the impossibility of deciding
this humpty-dumpty question of who or what broke the egg is
a proper subject for regulation. Such a regulation would not
be a limit of liability but a yardstick for measuring the damage
not caused by the carrier but due to the inherent nature of the
commodity.
The Commission report embodies basic findings to sup-
port this conclusion. . . . The tolerances represent the con-
sidered judgment of the Commission, after hearing voluminous
evidence as to the nature of shell eggs and the way they are
handled at railpoint, off railpoint and during shipment. I can-
580. Swift & Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 373, 381-82 (1952).
581. Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 350 U.S. 162 (1956) ; cf. FTC v.
Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1955) ; FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343
U.S. 470 (1952).
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not say that this is not an allowable judgment for the Com-
mission to make. 8 2
The adequacy of the agency's findings were also challenged in
American Airlines, Inc. v. North Am. Airlines, Inc.5"3 in which Justice
Minton wrote the Court's opinion upholding a CAB order directing
North American to cease using that name because of its similarity to
American Airlines. The dissenting justices urged that the Board must
find that passengers missed flights or bought the wrong tickets in order
to sustain its order."' But pointing to the Board's findings that public
confusion from the similarity in names had caused passengers to direct
inquiries to, check in at and attempt to retrieve baggage from, the wrong
airline, Justice Minton concluded that:
Under § 411 it is the Board that speaks in the public in-
terest. We do not sit to determine independently what is the
public interest in matters of this kind, committed as they are
to the judgment of the Board. We decide only whether, in
determining what is the public interest, the Board has stayed
within its jurisdiction and applied criteria appropriate to that
determination. The Board has done that in the instant case.
Considerations of the high standards required of common car-
riers in dealing with the public, convenience of the traveling
public, speed and efficiency in air transport, and protection of
reliance on a carrier's equipment are all criteria which the Board
in its judgment may properly employ to determine whether the
public interest justifies use of its powers under § 411Y."'
Justice Minton also wrote the Court's opinion upholding the exer-
cise of discretion by the NLRB in refusing to deduct state unemployment
compensation benefits from back pay awards." 6 He pointed out that:
To effectuate the policies of the Act the Board has broad
but not unlimited discretion. . . . We must not, however, be
more mindful of the limits of the Board's discretion than we
are of our own limited function in reviewing Board orders."8
But he also relied on the fact that Congress had re-enacted the applicable
provision with knowledge of this position of the Board, saying:
582. Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 350 U.S. 162, 177-78 (1956) (dis-
senting opinion).
583. 351 U.S. 79 (1956).
584. Id. at 87-90 (dissenting opinion).
585. Id. at 85.
586. NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951).
587. Id. at 362-63.
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In the course of adopting the 1947 amendments Congress con-
sidered in great detail the provisions of the earlier legislation as
they had been applied by the Board. Under these circumstances
it is a fair assumption that by reenacting without pertinent
modification the provision with which we here deal, Congress
accepted the construction placed thereon by the Board and ap-
proved by the courts."'
This led him to dissent from the Court's opinion in a subsequent case sus-
taining a change by the Board in computing its back pay formula to a
quarterly basis. 8 9
ie similarly objected to a changed administrative interpretation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act59 which brought within the coverage of
the Act employees engaged in new construction of facilities to be used in
interstate commerce. 9' Dissenting from the Court's opinion sustaining
the new interpretation, Justice Minton made a strong plea for consistency
not only in administrative interpretations, but also in the Court's deci-
sions, saying:
It seems, therefore, that the Secretary of Labor has quite
recently changed his mind about the application of the Act to
new construction not yet used or not an integral part of inter-
state commerce. His change of mind should not change the
law. This Court, which may change the law, seems to have
changed its mind about the same time and without saying why
it does so, except that the foregoing cases are of a different
vintage. I am unable to distinguish the cases on the vintage
test. Without overruling the Racymond, White and Murphey
decisions and the number of cases decided by the Circuit Courtq,
this Court brushes them off as of another vintage.
Reliance upon this Court's opinions becomes a hazardous
business for lawyers and judges, not to mention contractors,
who are not familiar with the vintage test. 9
This case also illustrates that Justice Minton gave little or no weight to
administrative interpretations of particular statutory provisions. Ac-
cordingly, he rejected the ICC's contention that the Safety Appliance
588. Id. at 366.
589. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
590. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1952), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (Supp. V, 1958).
591. Mitchell v. C.W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427 (1955) ; cf. Alstate Constr. Co.
v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13 (1953) ; Thomas v. Kempt Brothers, 345 U.S. 19 (1953).
592. Mitchell v. C.W. Vollmer & Co., supra note 591, at 434 (dissenting opinion).
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Act 93 does not apply to dome running boards, concluding that "there is
no reason to import such a distinction into § 2 in order to deny the hu-
mane benefits of the Act to those who perform dangerous work on train
cars that are not moving." '' In another case he wrote the Court's opinion
holding that government employees who worked on holidays were en-
titled both to holiday pay and time-and-a-half for the hours worked, re-
jecting a contrary administrative interpretation by the Comptroller
General."'
His opinion for the Court in Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB.
is another illustration of his lack of deference to administrative interpre-
tations. Upsetting a decision of the NLRB contrary to the express pro-
vision of the statute which then permitted closed shop contracts, he con-
cluded that:
The claimed impotency of the contract as a defense here
rests not upon any provision of the Act of Congress or of state
law or the terms of the contract, but upon a policy declared by
the Board. . . . It is not necessary for us to justify the policy
of Congress. It is enough that we find it in the statute. That
policy cannot be defeated by the Board's policy, which would
make an unfair labor practice out of that which is authorized
by the Act. The Board cannot ignore the plain provisions of a
valid contract made in accordance with the letter and the spirit
of the statute and reform it to conform to the Board's idea of
correct policy. To sustain the Board's contention would be to
permit the Board under the guise of administration to put limi-
tations in the statute not placed there by Congress."'
Similarly, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, he rejected the
FPC's interpretation of its jurisdiction, saying:
The Commission found that Phillips' sales are part of the
production and gathering process, or are "at least an exempt
incident thereof." This determination appears to have been
based primarily on the Commission's reading of legislative his-
tory and its interpretation of certain decisions of this Court.
Also, there is some testimony in the record to the effect that
the meaning of "gathering" commonly accepted in the natural-
gas industry comprehends the sales incident to the physical ac-
593. 36 Stat. 298 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § 11 (1952).
594. Shields v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 350 U.S. 318, 324-25 (1956).
595. United States v. Kelly, 342 U.S. 193 (1952).
596. 338 U.S. 355 (1949).
597. Id. at 362-63.
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tivity of collecting and processing the gas. Petitioners contend
that the Commission's finding has a reasonable basis in law and
is supported by substantial evidence of record and therefore
should be accepted by the courts, particularly since the Com-
mission has "consistently" interpreted the Act as not con-
ferring jurisdiction over companies such as Phillips. ... We
are of the opinion, however, that the finding is without ade-
quate basis in law, and that production and gathering in the
sense that those terms are used in § 1 (b), end before the sales
by Phillips occur.598
Taken together, these cases demonstrate that in reviewing administra-
tive determinations, Justice Minton accorded considerable discretion to
administrative agencies in implementing the congressional plan by regu-
lation or decision, but that he did not defer to administrative experience
or expertise in the interpretation of statutory provisions.
E. PROCEDURE IN THE SUPREME COURT
Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal
courts to certain types of "cases" and "controversies" with respect to
most of which "the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction . . .
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make."' 99  Justice Minton joined in several decisions holding that the
Court lacked jurisdiction because there was no case or controversy. For
example, the Court refused to review a challenge to the reading of the
Old Testament in public schools where the only challengers were a tax-
payer and the parent of a graduated child.6"'
The Court has also devised a number of closely related rules limiting
the circumstances under which it will decide questions raised by the
parties, one of which is the requirement that a party must have "stand-
ing" to raise the question."' Application of this rule enables the Court
to avoid deciding difficult questions in trumped-up lawsuits and to pre-
vent parties from challenging action or legislation on grounds which
have no application to them. In Barrows v. Jackson0 °2 a white seller who
broke a racially-restrictive covenant by permitting the property to be
used by a non-Caucasian defended an action for breach of contract on
the ground that such covenants had been held to deny equal protection of
598. 347 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1954).
599. U.S. CONST. art. III.
600. Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
601. See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (concurring
opinion).
602. 346 U.S. 249- (1953).
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the laws in Shelley v. Kramer.13 However, the fact that no non-Caucasian
affected by the covenant was a party to this action against the white
seller made it difficult for the Court to extend the holding of the Shelley
case to this action without at the same time doing violence to its rule
concerning standing. Writing for the Court, Justice Minton carefully
distinguished both the jurisdictional decisions and those in which the
party challenging state action either had no real interest in the outcome
or sought to make a shotgun attack on comprehensive legislation. He
held that this was an appropriate case in which to make an exception to
the rule, saying:
But in the instant case, we are faced with a unique situation in
which it is the action of the state court which might result in a
denial of constitutional rights and in which it would be difficult
if not impossible for the persons whose rights are asserted to
present their grievance before any court. Under the peculiar
circumstances of this case, we believe the reasons which under-
lie our rule denying standing to raise another's rights, which is
only a rule of practice, are outweighed by the need to protect
the fundamental rights which would be denied by permitting the
damages action to be maintained ...
Consistency in the application of the rules of practice in
this Court does not require us in this unique set of circum-
stances to put the State in such an equivocal position simply be-
cause the person against whom the injury is directed is not be-
fore the Court to speak for himself. The law will permit re-
spondent to resist any effort to compel her to observe such a
covenant, so widely condemned by the courts, since she is the
one in whose charge and keeping reposes the power to continue
to use her property to discriminate or to discontinue such use.6"4
The Court similarly refuses to review state judgments which can be
supported on an adequate state ground even though a federal question
may also have been involved. Accordingly, Justice Minton wrote the
Court's opinion dismissing a writ of certiorari originally granted where
it appeared "that the Supreme Court of Georgia might have rested its
order on a non-federal ground. We are without jurisdiction when the
question of the existence of an adequate state ground is debatable. ' 60 5
603. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
604. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257-59 (1953).
605. Stembridge v. Georgia, 343 U.S. 541, 547-48 (1952) ; see Durley v. Mayo, 351
U.S. 277 (1956).
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Sometimes, however, where it was not clear whether or not the
state's judgment rested on a state ground, the Court took jurisdiction and
remanded the case for a determination of that question. justice Minton
dissented in several such cases in which he thought it clear that the deci-
sion below was based upon a state ground. For example, he dissented
from the Court's decision remanding an Illinois case to determine the
basis for the Illinois court's decision denying post-conviction relief."0 6
Similarly, he urged in dissent that another writ in an Ohio case should
have been dismissed because even though the state court's opinion relied
upon the fourteenth amendment, the syllabus to the opinion, which under
Ohio law was the official decision of the court, relied upon a state
ground." 7 And he likewise dissented from the Court's decision remand-
ing a Georgia judgment refusing to grant a post-conviction motion for a
new trial based upon discriminatory selection of the jury panel."0 s jus-
tice Minton urged that it was clear that the decision rested on a state
ground because the defendant had failed to challenge the jury panel at
the outset as required by Georgia law. In his view:
The promulgation of such a rule of law is, as we have
pointed out, fair and reasonable and cannot be said to deny due
process of law. Georgia has provided a reasonable time and
manner in which the question could be raised ...
This Court now says that the Georgia Supreme Court has
the power to grant the petitioner's motion. I suppose that it
has, but I would not think that it had denied a federal constitu-
tional right if it did not change its rule. In fact, I think it would
lead to absurd results if it changes its rule that the challenge to
the array must be made at the threshold. The defendant, know-
ing of an error in the constitution of the array, could lay low
and always have a built-in error on which he could rely if he did
not like the results at the trial. Georgia is not bound to change
its rule on penalty of a violation of the Federal Constitution.
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, . . . does not decide this case
because in that proceeding the challenge was timely made.
We do not sit as a legal critic to indicate how we think
courts should act. If a federal constitutional right is not pre-
sented, we have no duty to perform. There was no denial of
equal protection of the law or of due process. This case was
606. Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951).
607. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
608. Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955).
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disposed of by the Georgia Supreme Court altogether on state
grounds. In such circumstances our duty is clear."' 9
One of the exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction adopted
by Congress pursuant to Article III of the Constitution is embodied in
the statutory requirement limiting the Court's jurisdiction over state
courts to "final" judgments. 1 ' Just as in other contexts, to Justice Min-
ton final meant just that. Accordingly, he wrote the Court's opinion
dismissing the writ of certiorari with respect to a temporary injunction
against peaceful picketing. 1' Despite the attractiveness of the argument
of the dissent that the temporary injunction might well break the strike
if permitted to stand, Justice Minton and the Court seem clearly correct
in concluding that: "It is argued that if this is not held to be a final
decree or judgment and decided now, it may never be decided, because to
await the outcome of the final hearing is to moot the question and to
frustrate the picketing. However appealing such argument may be, it
does not warrant us in enlarging our jurisdiction. Only Congress may
do that."' 12
Justice Minton's opinions in all of these cases demonstrate that he
was extremely conscious of, and insistent upon adhering to, the constitu-
tional and statutory limitations imposed on the Court's jurisdiction, re-
gardless of resulting justice or injustice. His opinion in Barrows v.
Jackson illustrates, however, that where the obstacle to the Court's decid-
ing the case was within the Court's own discretion, he was sufficiently
imaginative to surmount it in appropriate circumstances.
With respect to what is perhaps for practical purposes the most im-
portant procedural aspect of the Court's jurisdiction, the grounds upon
which it grants certiorari, it is difficult to draw any conclusions as to his
views because the individual votes of the justices are not normally re-
corded and written opinions are rare. The Court was severely criticized
during Justice Minton's tenure for hearing too few cases, 8 ' while since
his retirement it has been attacked from other quarters for hearing too
many."1 Since the most plausible explanation for this change in its
609. Id. at 406-07; cf. Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956) ; Poulos
v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
610. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1952).
611. Montgomery Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co.,
344 U.S. 178 (1952).
612. Id. at 181.
613. E.g., Rodell, Our Not So Supreme Court, Look Magazine, July 31, 1951, p. 60;
Frank, The United States Supreme Court, 1949-50, 18 U. Cml. L. Ruv. 1, 39 (1950) ;
Harper and Rosenthal, What The Supreme Court Did Not Do In The 1949 Terv--An
Appraisal of Certiorari, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 293 (1950).
614. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 HARv. L. Rxv. 85, 95-106 (1957).
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certiorari policy lies in changes in the composition of the Court, it seems
likely that Justice Minton adhered to the stricter view which prevailed
while he was a member of the Court.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In balancing the power of government against the freedom of in-
dividuals in doubtful cases, Justice Minton ordinarily voted to sustain
the power of the majority to impose restrictions on individual liberty.
He made it clear that in his view the Court's function in such cases is
limited solely to the issue of power and does not extend to judging the
wisdom of exercising that power. Similarly, he usually voted to sustain
restrictions on procedural protections of those affected by the exercise of
governmental power, consistently rejecting, for example, claims of pro-
cedural deficiencies by criminal defendants who made no claim to in-
nocence. In related cases such as those involving entering aliens, alleged
draft-dodgers and courts-martial defendants, he extended this position
to the outer limits by upholding drastic limitations on the procedural
protections of those affected.
Likewise, he consistently voted to sustain the exercises of state power
against challenges based on the due process clause or on federal occu-
pancy of the field. In common with the rest of the Court, he denied the
existence of state power to discriminate on the basis of race or religion,
but consistent with his other views with respect to the constitutional allo-
cation of power and the necessity for judicial self-restraint, he refused to
extend such decisions to what he regarded as private discrimination.
In interpreting statutes and other documents, he usually adhered to
a literal interpretation, refusing to resort to "liberal construction," and
ignoring the "gloss of history," where he thought no ambiguity existed.
He placed little reliance on administrative interpretations, and he was
careful to avoid treating a state's characterization as conclusive for pur-
poses of interpreting a federal statute. In procedural matters he ac-
corded considerable discretion on trial courts, and voted in favor of evi-
dentiary rules which tend to bring about maximum development of the
truth. Similarly, he recognized the existence of substantial discretion in
administrative agencies in implementing federal legislation. Overall, he
strove to maintain consistency in the Court's decisions.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that Justice Minton (or
any other Justice, for that matter) could dispose of any case by applying
a set of generalities such as the foregoing without regard to its particular
facts. Almost invariably Justice Minton's opinions commenced with a
careful, concise statement of the pertinent facts, which were frequently
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reiterated in his discussion of the legal issues. Most of his opinions were
models of clarity, so that one usually had no doubt what he was deciding,
however much one might disagree with his conclusions. Among his most
important opinions were those which have been most severely criticized,
such as Rabinowitp, Knauff and Adler. Equally essential to a fair evalu-
ation of his contribution to the Court, however, were such opinions as
Barrows, Rainspeck, Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, Buck v. California, and
the Phillips Petroleum case.
So long as the Court continues to be the final arbiter of extremely
difficult constitutional and other federal questions, it will always be sub-
ject to attack from one quarter or another. In Justice Minton's early
years on the Court, the principal criticism came from those who thought
the Court was not sufficiently sensitive to civil rights, and who often
equated the political merits of legislation in this field with its constitu-
tionality. Commencing with the decision in the Segregation Cases, the
source of the attack shifted to those who urged that the Court was un-
duly interfering with the power of the states in our federal system. In
law, as in politics (and, I suppose, most fields of endeavor), the most
active and vocal comment usually comes from those who disagree, and
criticism is often unrestrained. Frequently, disagreement with the Court's
conclusions is not limited to intellectual differences, but is instead attri-
buted to laziness, stupidity, or more sinister motives. For example, some
of the Court's current critics have hinted that some of its recent decisions
are Communist-inspired, although surely to any lawyer who has bothered
to read and think about the Court's recent decisions involving alleged
Communists, it must be clear that at worst they represent an overemphasis
of civil liberties which is the antithesis of international Communism as
it exists in the world today. Such criticism usually results from a failure
to relate the Court's decision to the facts of the case (although in some
instances the breadth of the Court's opinions has probably contributed to
that failure). In this respect the current controversy over the Court's
performance is no different from the attacks on the decisions of the
"Truman Court."
I suppose that no one, with the possible exception of Justice Minton
himself, would agree with his vote in every case in which he participated
or with everything he wrote in his opinions. Intellectually or emotion-
ally reasonable men may differ with the Court's reasoning and conclu-
sion in a particular case, whether, for example, it be the position taken
by Justice Minton in the Adler case or the strikingly different approach
manifested by the majority in the Konigsberg case, both of which can be
supported or attacked on intellectual grounds.
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Justice Minton made perfectly plain his position with respect to
these problems of power. That many disagree is not surprising in view
of the importance of the conflicting considerations competing for supre-
macy. He was not a great justice in the sense of making a substantial
contribution to the growth of the law. In his admirable desire to main-
tain consistency in the law, and his resulting heavy reliance on prior
authority, he may have occasionally thwarted natural judicial develop-
ments justified by changing conditions in a dynamic world. Neverthe-
less, in his resolution of the problems of power, and in his recognition of
limitations on the power of the Court itself, his overall performance was
commendable. If he was not a Brandeis or a Holmes, neither, it is fair
to say, were many of his critics, either on or off the Court.
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